The 2025 Wars
An analysis of Ukraine’s air defence successes and limitation was published detailing the effectiveness of Ukraine and its allies’ air defense capabilities against many generations and types of Russian and former Soviet missile systems. D
A rear seat gunner in a slower propeller airplane, common in the First and Second World Wars, may become a more common means to counter drone threats in 2025.
An analysis of Ukraine’s air defence successes and limitation was published detailing the effectiveness of Ukraine and its allies’ air defense capabilities against many generations and types of Russian and former Soviet missile systems. Despite the unexpected limited success rate of Ukraine’s supported air defense and considering the idea that intercepting high speed ballistic missiles was not common knowledge prior to 2022, any defense against advanced missile systems is an impressive technological achievement. While the production of the more advanced missiles is slow and old Soviet stockpiles get used up, the next elements of future conflicts will certainly come from numerous and low tech systems now tearing up the front lines in the Ukraine War.
Drones from both sides of the conflict in Ukraine set an example for the use of such weapons all over the world. There are numerous accounts of drones crippling tanks and giving accurate and real time artillery coordinates, a recent team approach that is a perfect symbiosis for artillery brigades. Drones have become the scourge of armour, rapidly eliminating armour threats directly and degrading the assault capabilities of units while inflicting high economic and personnel costs on the opposing forces. Something that mirrors some of the most terrifying 80s sci-fi and horror films is the phenomenon of drones that literally and ruthlessly hunt down any soldier on the battlefield. Swarms of such drones are often spoken about by Russian soldiers, keeping them at a constant state of anxiety.
With conventional conflicts entering a stage of attrition, stalemate, and in some cases rapid progress, the drone effect will likely be seen outside of these conflict zones. Until there is a common and coordinated defense of drone threats, expect domestic attacks to take place using drones. Defending against a shooter or someone rushing a stage is something protective services are well trained in, but for the time being there is no effective defense against a swarm of armed drones targeting important officials. While new technologies are being rapidly developed, as in rapid fire burst ammunition for newly designed tanks, much of the defense has been via using older Cold War Oerlikon cannons in the field. There have even been some accounts of slower planes being used, with a copilot sitting in an open cockpit armed with a shot gun or other weapon to target drones. Aviation history may have certainly come full circle.
The response to a static battlefield will also come from asymmetrical attacks as seen in the Iraq and Afghanistan War, but will become more common inside of Allied nations. Infiltration through insufficient border controls have already resulted in security issues, taking advantage of perplexed policy approaches to local and immediate security threats. The inability to succeed on the conventional battlefield will result in attacks in urban environments, but instead of them being contained to Baghdad and Grozny, they will be seen, well, everywhere. The addition of crime, drugs and violence issues will reshape long standing trade and policy agreements until those threats can be considered neutralised. The issues of unstopped crime, innovation of drones, and active foreign agents needed to have been addressed years ago. The unfortunate results will become a signature characteristic of 2025.
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